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ABSTRACT  
In Russia, an increasing number of banks fail every 
year for various reasons. Some banks get closed 
voluntarily, some merge with other banks, whereas 
others have their licenses revoked by the Central 
Bank for noncompliance with Central Bank rules. 
But is a bank’s poor performance the only reason for 
a failure? With a use of new datasets on bank failures, 
this paper shows that bank survival is determined by 
far more than its performance. 
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INTRODUCTION  
Since 1991, more than 2,500 banks have failed due to 
various reasons in Russia. The pace of bank failures 
is reaching its maximum in the past two years with 
the coming of a new head of the Russian Central 
Bank, Elvira Nabiullina. The banks that survived 
until now experience unprecedented risks of failure. 
But what determines whether a bank will lose its 
license? 
 
In the substantially regulated Russian banking sector, 
all banks must comply with a list of prudential norms 
imposed on them by the Central Bank of Russia 
(CBR). All banks are further required to report their 
performance on these norms regularly. In a case of 
noncompliance with the regulations, the banks are 
penalised by the CBR. The question is, however, 
whether, the breaches of the CBR regulations are, 
indeed, the only reasons for license revocation. Are 
banks equally penalised for their misbehaviour or are 
there other factors that determine bank survival? For 
instance, does the business cycle have a significant 
impact on the failure risks? Do armed-conflicts affect 
failure rates? Or can it be the personality of the CBR 
head that determines how many banks will fail? 
 
Several studies assessed bank failures in the Russian 
banking sector and, in particular, analysed the 
relationship between the CBR and the failed banks.  
For instance, a study by Claeys and Schoors (2007) 
examined micro- and macro-prudential objectives of 
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the CBR’s bank licensing policy. They found that 
high deposit banks that operate on the interbank 
market are less likely to lose their license. The results 
of this study also showed that the CBR is reluctant to 
revoke bank’s license if there are too many failing 
banks in the sector. 
 
The results of the study by Malyutina and Parilova 
(2001) suggest that the CBR may sometimes pursue 
its private interests and chose not to penalise the risky 
banks. This behaviour allows the CBR to cut down 
the costs associated with a preventive closure.  
 
A more recent study by Karminsky and Kostrov 
(2014) examined the probability of default of Russian 
banks. The findings of the study suggest that CBR is 
often inclined to close a bank if the capital adequacy 
ratio of that bank is either too high and too low. 
 
The results of the study by Konstandina (2006) 
suggest that, unlike macroeconomic factors, bank-
specific characteristics affect the failure risks 
significantly. In particular, the management quality 
of the bank is an essential for the bank survival. 
Whereas, the study by Fungáčová and Weill (2009) 
found that an increased market competition has 
adverse effects on the survival of the banks in the 
sector. 
 
Although these studies examined bank failures in 
Russia, none of them has analysed whether the CBR 
justifications of bank failures are grounded. In 
particular, no one studied whether the banks that fail 
because of a specific CBR rule violation are, indeed, 
the banks that violate this rule more frequently than 
others. Furthermore, no study analysed the roles of 
the different CBR heads in bank failures. Finally, 
previous studies have not examined what external 
factors influence bank failures. 
 
This paper aims to test several determinants of bank 
failures in Russia and to examine whether banks that 
lose their license are penalised impartially for their 
misconduct. I use survival analysis framework in to 
assess failure risks of banks associated with specific 
bank characteristics or with an external factor. On the 
first question, I found that, overall, violations of the 
CBR rules lead to higher failure risks. Still, 
noncompliance with risk-regulating norms can 
sometimes lead to higher survival chances, which 
corresponds to the previous findings. Furthermore, in 
the time of armed conflicts, banks tend to have 
significantly lower failure risks than in peaceful time. 
Meanwhile, economic crisis tends to increase the risk 
of bank failure. The results of this study also show 
that in some federal districts of Russia banks are 
consistently more vulnerable to failures than in 
others. On the second question, I found that not all 
CBR heads are equally impartial in their license 
revocation policies. Notably, the results show that 
license revocation decisions of the current CBR head 
Elvira Nabiullina are the most well-grounded, as 
compared to the central bankers before her.  
 
The findings of this study correspond to the previous 
research. However, these results were impossible to 
obtain by the researchers in the past due to the lack 
of data on the CBR justifications of bank failures. For 
my study, I manually collected this data and 
generated a dataset that contains detailed information 
on all failed banks and their exact failure reasons 
since 1991. This dataset does not only consist of 
information on banks that lost their license, but also 
the banks that closed voluntarily or merged. In total, 
the dataset contains documented failure reasons for 
2,569 banks across Russia. This dataset enables me 
to differentiate between the banks in the way nobody 
has done it before me. In particular, I can group banks 
based on the reason for their failure and study the 
trends in failure justifications. Furthermore, by 
comparing failure reasons and banks' actual 
performance, I can examine whether the CBR 
penalises banks for their misconduct impartially. 
 
DATA  
In the scope of this research, I have worked with five 
different datasets. My supervisor Dr Alexei Karas has 
provided me with three datasets, and two datasets I 
generated manually on my own. Table 1 describes the 
sources and contents of all datasets I used. The 
combination of the five datasets provided me with 
access to quarterly bank performance data, the 
reasons and the types of bank failures, and the 
location of the banks. I could also see whether Russia 
experienced an economic crisis or participated in any 
armed conflict, as well as who was the head of the 
CBR in a given quarter of the year. 
 
METHODS  
I used survival analysis framework to assess 
vulnerability to failure of banks associated with a 
particular characteristic of a bank or with an external 
factor. A bank enters the dataset at the time of its 
registration and exits at the time of its failure. I 
distinguished between 3 types of bank failures:  
-­‐   Killed: the banks whose licenses were revoked by the 
CBR due to a certain misconduct.  
-­‐   Died: banks that closed voluntarily. 
-­‐   Merged: banks that merged with other banks. 
Furthermore, I distinguished between 5 different 
failure justifications groups as will be explained later 
in this paper.  
The analysis covers 105 quarters (26 years) and 3,152 
banks. In the end, only 18% of the banks survived.  
  
RESULTS  
1.   External factors 
In this study, I found that external factors such as 
geographical location, business cycle and war have 
different effects on the risks of failure in different 
failure-type groups.  
a.   Killed banks 
According to the findings of this study, the banks 
experience statistically higher risks of license 
revocation at the time of economic crisis. 
Furthermore, banks in Central, North Caucasian and 
Southern districts of Russia face higher failure risks 
than banks in other federal districts. Disturbingly, 
the results show that banks have lower risks of 
losing their license when Russia is engaged in an 
armed conflict. 
b.   Banks that died 
I observed similar trends in the group of banks that 
chose to close voluntarily. The results suggest that 
the risks of failure increase in peaceful times and 
during an economic crisis. Furthermore, I found that 
failure risks are higher in North Caucasian, Far 
Eastern and Volga districts as compared to others. 
c.   Merged banks 
Banks have statistically higher risks of stopping 
their operation due to a merger in peaceful times, 
whereas crisis has no statistically significant effect 
on failure risks. In North-western, Siberian and 
Volga districts, the risks of a merger are the highest 
among all federal districts.  
2.   Bank performance  
The findings of this study suggest that, overall, the 
violations of the CBR rules committed by banks tend 
to be statistically significant predictors of whether or 
not the bank will lose its licence. Table 2 illustrates 
the regression outcomes for each failure-type group. 
 
Violations of capital and liquidity norms (N1-N3) are 
associated with increased risks of license revocation, 
and this relationship is highly statistically significant.  
However, violations of norms that regulate risk-
taking decrease chances of license revocation. This 
finding goes in line with the previous research. 
Considering voluntary shutdowns and mergers, I 
found that violations of CBR norms are insignificant 
determinants of failures. The only exception is the 
violation of norm N11. This norm regulates the ratio 
of individual deposits to bank capital. The results of 
this study show that banks that violate N11 have 
statistically higher risks of merging. 
3.   CBR heads 
The results are distinct if I compare licence 
revocation risks associated with different heads of the 
CBR. More differences emerge if I consider different 
failure justifications. 
 
When the CBR revokes a bank's license, it has to 
present a justification for its decision. Having 
collected the relevant data, I divided banks into the 
groups based on the justification of their failure. In 
this study, I focused on the following five categories 
of banks:  
1)   Banks that lost their license because of violation 
of norm N1 (capital adequacy ratio). 
2)   Banks that lost their license because of violations 
of norms N2, N3 and N4 (liquidity ratios). 
3)   Banks that lost their license because of violations 
of norm N7 (risk measure). 
4)   Banks that lost their license because of poor 
management. 
5)   Banks that lost their license because of detected 
frauds. 
Tables 3-7 illustrate the regression outcomes for 
each of these groups and compare the coefficients 
obtained for different heads of the CBR.	  Overall, I 
found that the only central banker, whose decisions 
on license revocation are highly sensitive to the 
actual bank performance is Elvira Nabiullina, the 
current head of the CBR. Since her appointment as 
the CBR chair, increased number of norm violations 
lead to drastically higher risks of license revocation 
in every failure group.  
 
For other central bankers, norm violations also have 
a positive relationship with bank failure risks, yet 
the coefficients are ten times smaller than in the case 
of Nabiullina. Lower coefficients suggest a weaker 
relationship between banks' behaviour and the 
penalty they receive. Furthermore, when the CBR is 
not lead by Nabiullina, an increased number of 
norm violations decreases the risks of bank failure 
in several failure groups. A negative relationship 
between violations and failure risks may signal that 
central bankers before Nabiullina sometimes failed 
to implement their license revocation policies 
impartially.  
 
Primarily, the results this study show that banks have 
considerably lower survival chances when CBR is 
lead by Elvira Nabiullina. When Elvira Nabiullina is 
a head of the CBR, regardless of the failure reason 
there are two CBR norms that, if violated, 
substantially increase the chances of license 
revocation. Those norms are N2 (quick liquidity 
ratio) and N7 (large risk to capital ratio). Depending 
on a failure reason, however, there can be other 
significant predictors of a failure, the sensitivity of 
failure risks will vary as well. 
 
CONCLUSION  
The results of this study show that the survival of a 
bank in Russia is not determined by its performance 
only. Depending on who leads the CBR, some banks 
that violate the rules can still have good survival 
chances. Furthermore, external factors such as war, 
crisis and geographical location can significantly 
affect bank survival. 
A successful survival formula for a Russian bank that 
violates CBR norms is to function at the times of 
armed-conflict with Russian participation, with no 
economic crisis going on and with a head of the CBR 
different than Elvira Nabiullina. Fortunately, it is not 
up to banks to chose the external conditions. In the 
current circumstances, the most plausible locations 
for Russian banks to survive are Ural and North-
western districts. The banks that want to survive will 
also need to avoid breaches of norms N2 and N7 at 
all costs. 
 
STUDENT  CONTRIBUTION  
As it was described earlier in this paper, I have 
collected the data and generated a dataset on failed 
banks. This dataset covers a period of 1991-2017 and 
contains detailed information on failure justifications 
for 2,569 banks. Furthermore, I generated a dataset 
on external factors of bank failures that also covers 
the period of 1991-2017. Data analysis and paper 
writing were all performed by me. 
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TABLES  
Table 1: A brief description of the datasets used in the study. 
Origin Content Alterations 
Dataset on CBR Prudential Norms 
Provided 
by Dr 
Alexei 
Karas. 
Values of the CBR norms, 
which establish the 
borders for several bank 
performance- measures. 
Change the way the data is 
stored from monthly to 
quarterly; 
Merged with other datasets. 
Dataset on Bank Self-Reported Performance 
Provided 
by Dr 
Alexei 
Karas. 
Data on banks’ 
performance on every 
CBR norm from 1997 till 
2016. 
With the use of Regulations 
dataset,  
I generated variables that 
count whether or not a bank 
has violated a certain CBR 
norm (norm-performance); 
Merged with other datasets. 
Dataset on Bank Official Data 
Provided 
by Dr 
Contains information on 
the geographical location 
of banks and the dates of 
Merged with other datasets. 
Alexei 
Karas. 
their registration in the 
system. 
Dataset on Bank Failures 
Manually 
generated 
by myself 
with the 
data from 
banki.ru. 
 
Contains detailed 
information on the 
reasons of all bank 
failures starting from 
1991 and ending with 
2017. 
Based on documented 
failure reasons, I grouped 
banks into several categories 
to test whether banks are 
penalised for their 
misconduct fairly. 
Dataset on External Factors 
Manually 
generated 
by 
myself. 
Contains binary variables 
that would assign 1 to 
quarters of the year in 
which there was: a war 
with official participation 
of Russia or an economic 
crisis. 
Also contains information 
on particular CBR heads 
that were in charge at a 
particular time. 
N/A 
 
  
 
 
